National Defense Authorization Act of 2001 | WHAT REALLY HAPPENED


National Defense Authorization Act of 2001

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[I put this under commentary so it would not be truncated]
Division A
Title V
Subtitle D
Section 546 (a), page 119

(3) Numerous investigations following the attack on Pearl Harbor have documented that Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were not provided necessary and critical intelligence that was available, that foretold of war with Japan, that warned of imminent attack, and that would have alerted them to prepare for attack…

(7) On June 15, 1944 an investigation conducted by Admiral T. C. Hart at the direction of the Secretary of the Navy produced evidence, subsequently confirmed, that essential intelligence concerning Japanese intentions and war plans was available in Washington but was not shared with Admiral Kimmel.

(8) (B) detailed information and intelligence about Japanese intentions and war plans were available in “abundance” but were not shared with the Lieutenant General Short’s Hawaii command;

(15) The Dorn Report found -
(A) that “Army and Navy officials in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications… which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence of war”;

(16) … the degree to which the commanders of the United States forces in Hawaii were not alerted about the impending attack on Hawaii was directly attributable to the withholding of intelligence from Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short.

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