The Full Stash
of Diebold Memos

PDF Download - 3MB

The above PDF file contains an incriminating stash of Diebold Election Systems memos.

In the support link, check out October 2001 for the "alter the audit log in Access" memo, April 2000 for memos that refer to transmitting vote data from optical scan machines by cell phone, April 2002 for a Tab Iredale (senior programmer) memo that urges folks to avoid getting Windows CE certified by anyone, and January 2001 for a memo from Ken Clark (principal engineer) talking about how pointless it is to attempt a recount on a touch screen.

Then, bear in mind that GEMS programs 1.11.14 and 1.17.17 are certified -- and check out how many times they are installing 1.14.xx and 1.15.xx series and using them in elections! (Totally illegal: what this means is the software used in these elections was never looked at by ANYONE except a handful of programmers in Canada.) Pretty much throws the whole certification and testing argument out the window.

There are a few "gems" (pardon the pun) about blaming problems on the customer; one where they find that they upgraded software for the optical scan and now it won't work on some optical scan machines in Virginia. They discuss giving them new optical scans, but decide to instead find a way to blame it on the customer and make them pay for new machines.

Also look for one in Colorado Springs (El Paso County Colorado) where they discuss the fact that they can't pick up a check until they do a demo of what they sold, but they don't have software that does what they sold, so they discuss a way to fake the demo, mentioning they've faked it before...

Boring reading, but productive for anyone who wants to head directly into your attorney general's office and demand that we put a stop to using Diebold optical scan and touch screens.

See also:

How To Rig An Election In The United States
The 2004 US Elections: The Mother of all Vote Frauds

What Really Happened