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COURT RULINGS THAT SAY POLICE DO NOT HAVE OBLIGATION TO PROTECT CITIZENS FROM VIOLENT CRIME

In the United States, you can get a pizza delivered faster than you can get the police to come to your home!

To serve but not protect

He says he put his life on the line to stop a killer — and claims cops sat back and watched.

But city lawyers are arguing that the police had no legal duty to protect Joseph Lozito, the Long Island dad stabbed seven times trying to subdue madman Maksim Gelman — a courtroom maneuver the subway hero calls “disgraceful.”

But Obama says we are supposed to turn in our weapons and rely on the police to protect us?

Warren v. District of Columbia

Warren v. District of Columbia - 1981 – Two women were upstairs in a townhouse when they heard their roommate, a third woman, being attacked downstairs by intruders. They phoned the police several times and were assured that officers were on the way. After about 30 minutes, when their roommate’s screams had stopped, they assumed the police had finally arrived.

When the two women went downstairs they saw that in fact the police never came, but the intruders were still there. As the Warren court graphically states in the opinion: “For the next fourteen hours the women were held captive, raped, robbed, beaten, forced to commit sexual acts upon each other, and made to submit to the sexual demands of their attackers.” The three women sued the District of Columbia for failing to protect them, but D.C.’s highest court exonerated the District and its police, saying that it is a “fundamental principle of American law that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any individual citizen.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. Ct. of Ap., 1981).

 

By a 4-3 decision the court decided that Warren was not entitled to remedy at the bar despite the demonstrable abuse and ineptitude on the part of the police because no special relationship existed. The court stated that official police personnel and the government employing them owe no duty to victims of criminal acts and thus are not liable for a failure to provide adequate police protection unless a special relationship exists. The case was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim and the case never went to trial.[3]

The gun-grabbers insist we should turn in our guns and rely on the police to protect us from crime. Yet the court continue to rule that the police are under no obligation to protect the public.

Castle Rock v. Gonzales

WASHINGTON – June, 2005 - The Supreme Court ruled that the police did not have a constitutional duty to protect a person from harm, even a woman who had obtained a court-issued protective order against a violent husband making an arrest mandatory for a violation.

The police didn’t respond to a woman’s pleas for help after her estranged husband violated a protective order by kidnaping their three young daughters, whom he eventually killed.

For hours on the night of June 22, 1999, Jessica Gonzales tried to get the Castle Rock police to find and arrest her estranged husband, Simon Gonzales, who was under a court order to stay 100 yards away from the house. He had taken the children, ages 7, 9 and 10, as they played outside, and he later called his wife to tell her that he had the girls at an amusement park in Denver.

Ms. Gonzales conveyed the information to the police, but they failed to act before Mr. Gonzales arrived at the police station hours later firing a gun, with the bodies of the girls in the back of his truck. The police killed him at the scene.

 

Gonzales filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Castle Rock, Colorado, its police department, and the three individual police officers with whom she had spoken under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming a Federally-protected property interest in enforcement of the restraining order and alleging "an official policy or custom of failing to respond properly to complaints of restraining order violations." A motion to dismiss the case was granted, and Gonzales appealed to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected Gonzales's substantive due process claim but found a procedural due process claim; an en banc rehearing reached the same conclusion. The court also affirmed the finding that the three individual officers had qualified immunity and as such could not be sued.

The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision, reinstating the District Court's order of dismissal. The Court's majority opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia held that enforcement of the restraining order was not mandatory under Colorado law; were a mandate for enforcement to exist, it would not create an individual right to enforcement that could be considered a protected entitlement under the precedent of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth; and even if there were a protected individual entitlement to enforcement of a restraining order, such entitlement would have no monetary value and hence would not count as property for the Due Process Clause.

The gun-grabbers insist we should turn in our guns and rely on the police to protect us from crime. Yet the court continue to rule that the police are under no obligation to protect the public.

 

Davidson v. City of Westminster , 32 Cal.3d 197

According to the complaint, Yolanda Davidson was stabbed four times by Jack Blackmun while in a public laundromat. On three earlier occasions women had been stabbed at the same or nearby laundromats. The evening before Yolanda's stabbing, two police officers had the laundromat under surveillance when another stabbing occurred; the police chased the suspect but failed to catch him. The next evening the officers had the laundromat under surveillance for the purpose of preventing assaults and apprehending the felon. The officers were aware of Yolanda's presence in the laundromat throughout the surveillance. After about an hour of surveillance, they saw a man on the premises who closely resembled the attacker of the previous evening and, while watching him for 15 minutes, identified him as the likely perpetrator of that assault. As the officers watched, the suspect entered and left the laundromat "several times." The officers did not warn Yolanda. Eventually she was stabbed.

Yolanda seeks to recover from the city and the officers on the basis of causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and for negligent investigation, failure to protect, and failure to warn. The causes of action in negligence allege that special relationships existed between Yolanda and the officers as well as between the assailant and the officers, each of which imposed a duty of care on the officers. fn. 1

Defendants demurred, contending (1) that no "special relationship" giving rise to a duty of care existed under the allegations of the complaint, and (2) that, in any event, the action was barred under the immunity provisions of Government Code section 845, which absolve a public entity or employee of liability for failure to provide adequate police protection. fn. 2 Without indicating the grounds for its ruling, the trial court sustained the demurrer. On this appeal, plaintiffs maintain that neither of the defendants' arguments support the trial court judgment.

1982 -A husband and wife who were assaulted in a Laundromat while the assailant was under surveillance by officers, brought legal action against the city and the officers for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and for negligent investigation, failure to protect and failure to warn.

The Supreme Court held that: (1) the mere fact that the officers had previously recognized the assailant from a distance as a potential assailant because of his resemblance to a person suspected of perpetrating a prior assault did not establish a “special relationship” between officers and assailant under which a duty would be imposed on officers to control assailant’s conduct; (2) factors consisting of officer’s prior recognition of assailant as likely perpetrator of previous assault and officer’s surveillance of assailant in laundromat in which victim was present did not give rise to special relationship between officers and victim so as to impose duty on officers to protect victim from assailant; and (3) victim could not maintain cause of action for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, in view of fact that it was not alleged that officers failed to act for the purpose of causing emotional injury, and that in the absence of such an intent to injure, officer’s inaction was not extreme or outrageous conduct.

 

The gun-grabbers insist we should turn in our guns and rely on the police to protect us from crime. Yet the court continue to rule that the police are under no obligation to protect the public.

Hartzler v. City of San Jose (1975) , 46 Cal.App.3d 6

The first amended complaint alleged in substance: On September 4, 1972, plaintiff's decedent, Ruth Bunnell, telephoned the main office of the San Jose Police Department and reported that her estranged husband, Mack Bunnell, had called her, saying that he was coming to her residence to kill her. She requested immediate police aid; the department refused to come to her aid at that time, and asked that she call the department again when Mack Bunnell had arrived.

Approximately 45 minutes later, Mack Bunnell arrived at her home and stabbed her to death. The police did not arrive until 3 a.m., in response to a call of a neighbor. By this time Mrs. Bunnell was dead.

Appellant has failed to plead facts supporting an assumption that a special relationship existed between decedent and the San Jose Police Department. The allegation that the police had responded 20 times to her calls and had arrested her husband once does not indicate that the department had assumed a duty toward decedent greater than the duty owed to another member of the public. The police may have responded repeatedly to her calls, only to discover that she was not in danger. Absent an indication that the police had induced decedent's reliance on a promise, express or implied, that they would provide her with protection, it must be concluded that no special relationship existed and that appellant has not stated a cause of action.

The judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

 

Linda Riss v. City of New York

Linda Riss, an attractive young woman, was for more than six months terrorized by a rejected suitor well known to the courts of this State, one Burton Pugach. This miscreant, masquerading as a respectable attorney, repeatedly threatened to have Linda killed or maimed if she did not yield to him: 'If I can't have you, no one else will have you, and when I get through with you, no one else will want you'. In fear for her life, she went to those charged by law with the duty of preserving and safeguarding the lives of the citizens and residents of this State. Linda's repeated and almost pathetic pleas for aid were received with little more than indifference. Whatever help she was given was not commensurate with the identifiable danger. On June 14, 1959 Linda became engaged to another man. At a party held to celebrate the event, she received a phone call warning her that it was her 'last chance'. Completely distraught, she called the police, begging for help, but was refused. The next day Pugach carried out his dire threats in the very manner he had foretold by having a hired thug throw lye in Linda's face. Linda was blinded in one eye, lost a good portion of her vision in the other, and her face was permanently scarred.

For all of these reasons, there is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper allocation of the powers of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve out an area of tort liability for police protection to members of the public. Quite distinguishable, of course, is the situation where the police authorities undertake responsibilities to particular members of the public and expose them, without adequate protection, to the risks which then materialize into actual losses (Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154 N.E.2d 534).

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division affirming the judgment of dismissal should be affirmed.

DeShaney v. Winnebago County

Rehnquist's opinion stated that although the DSS's failure to act may have made it liable for a tort under Wisconsin state law, the 14th Amendment does not transform every tort by a state actor into a violation of Constitutional Rights. Specifically, the act of creating a Department of Social Services to investigate and respond to allegations of child abuse may have meant that Winnebago County assumed a duty to prevent what Randy DeShaney did to Joshua DeShaney, and failure to fulfill that duty may have constituted a tort.

In other words this means the only people the police are duty-bound to protect are criminals in custody, and other persons in custody for such things as mental disorders.

1991 – In DeShaney the injured party was a boy who was beaten and permanently injured by his father. He claimed a special relationship existed because local officials knew he was being abused, indeed they had “specifically proclaimed by word and deed [their] intention to protect him against that danger,” but failed to remove him from his father’s custody.

Susman v. City of Los Angeles269 Cal. App. 2d 803

Professor Van Alstyne has stated: "A public entity is not liable for injuries caused by 'failing to enforce any law.' Govt C § 818.2.public employees enjoy a similar immunity: They are not liable for injuries caused by 'failure to enforce an enactment.' Govt C § 821. 'Law' is broader in scope than 'enactment,' including not only statutes, ordinances, charter provisions, rules, and regulations, but also state and federal decisional law as far as applicable in California. Govt C §§ 810.6, 811. ... The immunity in § 818.2 prevails over statutory entity liabilities that do not clearly indicate otherwise. Govt C § 815(b), 815.2(b). ... For example, it supersedes the liability imposed by Govt C § 815.6 for failure to discharge a mandatory duty." (Van Alstyne, California Government Tort Liability (Cont. Ed. Bar 1964) § 5.46, p. 154.)

An action was brought by several landowners against the City of Los Angeles and the State pleading eleven separate causes of action for damages arising out of the ‘Watts’ Riots’ of 1965. The Court of Appeal held that none of the allegations presented was sufficient to show any duty owed by any of the officials named as defendants to act to prevent or avoid the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

 

South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (How.) 396, 15 L.Ed.433 (1856) (the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that local law-enforcement had no duty to protect individuals, but only a general duty to enforce the laws.)

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1989 (1989) (There is no merit to petitioner's contention that the State's knowledge of his danger and expressions of willingness to protect him against that danger established a "special relationship" giving rise to an affirmative constitutional duty to protect. While certain "special relationships" created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process [489 U.S. 189, 190] Clause, to provide adequate protection, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/489/189.html

The gun-grabbers insist we should turn in our guns and rely on the police to protect us from crime. Yet the court continue to rule that the police are under no obligation to protect the public.

Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (no federal constitutional requirement that police provide protection)

Calogrides v. Mobile, 475 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1985); Cal Govt. Code 845 (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Calogrides v. Mobile, 846 (no liability for failure to arrest or to retain arrested person in custody)

Davidson v. Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 185, Cal. Rep. 252; 649 P.2d 894 (1982) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Stone v. State 106 Cal.App.3d 924, 165 Cal Rep. 339 (1980) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C.App. 1983) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C.App 1981) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Sapp v. Tallahassee, 348 So.2d 363 (Fla. App. 1st Dist.), cert. denied 354 So.2d 985 (Fla. 1977); Ill. Rec. Stat. 4-102 (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Keane v. Chicago, 98 Ill. App.2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1st Dist. 1968) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Jamison v. Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 3d 567 (1st Dist. 1977) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Simpson’s Food Fair v. Evansville, 272 N.E.2d 871 (Ind. App.) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Silver v. Minneapolis, 170 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 1969) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Wuetrich V. Delia, 155 N.J. Super. 324, 326, 382, A.2d 929, 930 cert. denied 77 N.J. 486, 391 A.2d 500 (1978) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Chapman v. Philadelphia, 290 Pa. Super. 281, 434 A.2d 753 (Penn. 1981) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

Morris v. Musser, 84 Pa. Cmwth. 170, 478 A.2d 937 (1984) (no liability for failure to provide police protection)

As a side note, we have had a meth dealer in our neighborhood for two years now. From the chemical smells coming from their unit, it appears they are actually manufacturing. We have complained to the cops constantly. One of our neighbors son is a member of the Honolulu Police Department and he has filed a report. But nothing has been done. The police are too busy writing lucrative traffic tickets and "monitoring" the Occupy Honolulu people to actually deal with real crimes.

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